Abstract-While the original public-key encryption with keyword search scheme (PEKS) has been pointed out to be insecure against off-line keyword-guessing attacks, some public-key encryption with designated tester schemes (dPEKS) proposed recently also encounter the same attacks. Rhee et al. proposed a dPEKS which is intended to prevent the off-line keyword-guessing attacks. However, we find that the off-line keyword-guessing attacks are still working in the test phase when some malicious servers exist. Hence, we add a random parameter into the test phase of Rhee et al.'s scheme to get a more secure and improved dPEKS scheme so as to prevent from keyword-guessing attacks and to benefit the advantages of dPEKS as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
To protect the confidentiality of sensitive data in clouding-computing environments, a reliable encryption technology is used to encrypt the sensitive data stored in the server. For a user issuing a keyword searching on the encrypted data, the server unavoidably faces the security problem of how to process the search without revealing any sensitive information. Especially, the server maintaining the database of encrypted data is not trusty.
The public-key encryption with keyword search scheme (PEKS) is first proposed by Boneh et al. (2004) [1] . Based on Boneh et al.'s scheme, Hwang and Lee (2007) [2] proposed another PEKS scheme for multi-receiver. The concept of proxy re-encryption is applied in keyword search by Shao et al. (2010) [3] and by Yau and Phan (2010) [4] as well. Recently, a conjunctive subset keywords search is proposed by Zhang et al. (2011) [5] .
However, Baek et al. (2006) [6] pointed out that an outside attacker in the PEKS scheme could perform the test process by collecting the transmitted ciphertexts and trapdoors. Thus the attacker could further construct the relationship between encrypted data and the given trapdoors of known keywords. Therefore, Baek et al. [6] proposed their public-key encryption scheme with designated tester (dPEKS) to solve the problem. In Baek et al.'s scheme, the keyword encryption function includes the server's public key such that, in the test processing, the server's private key is needed. Hence, their scheme equips the property of designated tester.
In the same year, Bynum et al. (2006) [7] pointed out that the design of trapdoors in PEKS scheme was insecure against off-line keyword-guessing attacks. Because an attacker can choose a keyword to test whether the captured trapdoor includes the guessed keyword with the receiver's public key and bilinear map operation, the interested keyword of the receiver is revealed. Unfortunately, although Beak et al.'s dPEKS scheme [6] achieves tester designating, the trapdoor's structure is the same with that in PEKS's. Inheritably, their scheme cannot prevent off-line keyword-guessing attacks.
Therefore based on Beak et al.'s dPEKS scheme [6] , Rhee et al. (2010) [8] enhanced the trapdoor security so as to prevent from off-line keyword-guessing attacks. The enhanced scheme keeps the property of designated tester and redefines the trapdoor function. The redefined trapdoor includes the server's public key and a random parameter. That is, before doing test, the server's private key is also needed, and the random parameter makes the off-line keyword-guessing attacks of outside attacker impossible.
Rhee et al. [8] claimed that their dPEKS scheme with a new trapdoor function was secure against keyword-guessing attacks. Yet, we would like to point out their trapdoor design was still on the risk of keyword-guessing attacks especially by malicious servers in this paper. In this paper, the authors present an improved dPEKS scheme to avoid this drawback.
II. CRYPTANALYSIS OF RHEE ET AL.'S DPEKS SCHEME
In this section, we would like to review the Rhee et al.'s dPEKS scheme [8] first and then try to point out their security problems. 
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B. Security Problem
In the test phase of Rhee et al.'s dPEKS scheme, the server can compute
Accordingly, we found that a malicious server can forwardly compute ( , ( ')) e P H W to guess which keyword the receiver is interested in. The process of malicious server's keyword guessing attacks is illustrated in Fig. 2 . To prevent the risk of keyword-guessing attacks from a malicious server, receiver's public key was redefined, and a random number u is introduced into the redefined public key computed by the receiver. The process of the proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3 . The process of the proposed schemecorrectness and security analysis
A. Correctness
To prove the design of dPEKS and trapdoor for testing are correct and feasible, the detailed computation of 3 
T and test
processing are shown as follows. 
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B. Security Analysis
The security analysis of proposed scheme is described as follows.
Proposition 1: Designated tester
The only designated server can perform the test processing.
Proof:
In the dPEKS function, In dPEKS function, it includes a random parameter r . Hence, without knowing r , the attacker cannot perform keyword-guessing attacks.
In trapdoor function, it uses another random parameter, ' r , and private key of receiver, R sk y = . Hence, without these two parameters, the attacker cannot perform keyword-guessing attacks.
Proposition 3: Prevent malicious servers
According to the trapdoor function, a malicious server cannot perform keyword-guessing attacks.
Proof:
In the test phase of our improvement, when a malicious server computes 3 T , he will get 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have pointed out the Rhee et al.'s dPEKS scheme [8] with the weakness against off-line keyword-guessing attacks by malicious servers. Hence, we modify their scheme and propose an improved dPEKS scheme to prevent the attacks from malicious servers. And the improvement is demonstrated to prevent attacks from the malicious servers.
